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Model Sentencing Guidelines 3.1-Aggravating or
Mitigating Role
(a) Offense Level Adjustments: Based on the defendant's
role in the offense, adjust the offense level as follows:
(i) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager,
or supervisor of a criminal activity that involved five
or more participants, increase by one level.
(2) If the defendant was a minimal participant in the
offense, decrease by one level.
(b) Advisory factors to be considered in setting sentence
within applicable range
(i) Aggravating factor: The defendant was an organ-
izer, leader, manager, or supervisor of a criminal
activity that involved fewer than five participants, or
was otherwise extensive.
(2) Mitigating factor: The defendant was a minor par-
ticipant in the offense.
Application Notes:
i. A "participant" is a person who is criminally responsible for
the offense, but need not have been convicted of the offense. A
person who is not criminally responsible for the offense (e.g.,
an undercover law enforcement officer) is not a participant.
2. A "minimal participant" is a defendant who is plainly
among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of
a group. A defendant's lack of knowledge or understanding
of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activi-
ties of other participants is indicative of a role as a minimal
participant.
3. A "minor participant" is a defendant who is less culpable
than most other participants, but whose role could not be
described as minimal.
4. In assessing whether a criminal activity or organization is
"otherwise extensive," all persons involved during the course of
the entire offense are to be considered. For example, afraud
that involved only three "participants" but used the unknow-
ing services of many outsiders could be considered extensive.
Drafter's Commentary
General Considerations
A consistent theme in criticisms of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines has been their purported failure to account
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adequately for defendant role. This criticism may perhaps
be overstated, or at the least insufficiently nuanced. After
all, the Guidelines now provide for two-level, three-level,
or four-level adjustments either up or down based on role
in the offense., Thus, the current Guidelines countenance
as much as an eight-offense-level swing based on role for
any defendant convicted of group criminal activity. In
practical terms, this means that for a first-time offender
whose otherwise applicable offense level is 24, correspon-
ding to a range of fifty-one to sixty-three months, a
four-level minimal participant reduction would lower the
range to thirty-three to forty-one months, a decline of
eighteen months in minimum sentence and twenty-two
months in maximum sentence. 2 The same hypothetical
defendant, if he were the recipient of a four-level aggravat-
ing role adjustment, would have his range enhanced to
level 28, or seventy-eight to ninety-seven months) In
short, for this defendant, role can change the minimum
guideline sentence by almost three years and the maxi-
mum sentence by four and one-half years. In percentage
terms, defendants under the current Guidelines can
receive a sentence reduction of more than 30 percent if
found to be a minimal participant, and a sentence increase
of more than 50 percent for a four-level aggravating role
enhancement. In short, whether considered in either
absolute or percentage terms, role can make a very big dif-
ference in a current guideline sentence.
In light of these facts, the persistent complaint that role
in the offense is insufficiently accounted for in the current
system seems puzzling. However, on closer examination,
the complaint is readily explainable. Part of the explanation
lies in the very long sentences prescribed by the current
guidelines system for drug offenses and in the relative
importance of role and quantity in setting those sentences.
Drug quantity can drive a guideline range very high, while
role can have only a limited mitigating effect. For example,
a first-time offender convicted of participation in smug-
gling one kilogram of heroin would have a base offense
level of 32, or 121 to iS months, based on drug quantity
alone.4 A two-level minor role adjustment would lower the
sentencing range to 97 to 121 months, and a four-level min-
imal role adjustment would lower the range to 78 to 97
months.5 Some observers think that a defendant who was,
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perhaps, a lookout for a single drug delivery or who loaned
a car to a friend or relative with knowledge that it might be
used in moving drugs should receive more consideration
and not be obliged to serve more than six years in prison.
For some, in cases like this, quantity matters too much and
role too little. Similar complaints are now beginning to be
heard in white-collar cases in light of recent dramatic
increases in loss-driven economic crime sentences. 6
A second reason for discontent with the current Guide-
lines' treatment of role is highlighted by the illustrative
case in the first paragraph above. Note that, in the hypo-
thetical, a four-offense-level decrease for minimal role
produces a decline in minimum sentence of eighteen
months, or about 30 percent, while a four-level increase
for aggravating role produces a rise in minimum sentence
of twenty-seven months, or about 50 percent. This is not
an anomalous case. Under the current guidelines, a miti-
gating role adjustment generally has less effect on
sentence than an aggravating role adjustment of the same
number of offense levels. This asymmetry results from
the logarithmic structure of the current guidelines sen-
tencing table, which is a consequence of the Sentencing
Reform Act's so-called 25 percent rule.7 On the current
sentencing table, beginning at Offense Level 12, each two-
offense-level step up the table produces a roughly 25
percent increase in minimum sentence. The compound-
ing effect of successive 25 percent increases produces
ever-wider ranges as one ascends the seriousness scale.
Thus, beginning at Offense Level 12, from any given point
on the table, a movement up the offense level scale of x
levels will produce a larger effect on sentence range than a
movement of x levels down the offense scale.
The model guidelines proposed here cannot entirely
eliminate either of the foregoing problems with role
adjustments under the current guideline, but they do ame-
liorate both difficulties. The asserted imbalance between
defendant role and substance quantity in drug cases prob-
ably could not be entirely eliminated, even if one were
disposed to do so, without a thoroughgoing reconsidera-
tion by Congress and the Sentencing Commission of the
place of drug quantity in both statutory and guidelines
drug sentencing rules. That reconsideration is beyond the
scope of this project. That said, the model role guideline
set out above together with the model sentencing grid
would give somewhat greater effect to role relative to
quantitative considerations.
First, because the ranges on the simplified grid are, in
general, significantly wider than those on the current
Guidelines' Sentencing Table, a one-level adjustment for
aggravating or mitigating role will generally represent a
larger shift in sentencing range than the maximum four-
level role adjustment would under the current system. For
example, a defendant in Level 5 of the Model Sentencing
Table would be subject to a sentencing range of five to
eight years. A one-level downward adjustment for mini-
mal role on the model grid would produce a sentencing
range of two to five years, and a one-level upward adjust-
ment for aggravating role would generate a sentence of
eight to eleven years.8 An analogous defendant in Offense
Level 26 of the existing guidelines would have a sentenc-
ing range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months, or about
five to six and one-half years.9 A four-level downward
adjustment for minimal role would produce a range of
forty-one to fifty-one months (three years, five months to
four years, three months), while a four-level upward
adjustment would generate a range of 97 to 121 months
(eight years, one month to ten years, one month)."' In this
case, role adjustments under the model system have a
slightly greater effect on sentencing range both up and
down. This would not always be the case for every possible
defendant, but the basic pattern holds across the popula-
tion of defendants.
In addition, note that because the model sentencing
table employs sentencing ranges of more constant width
than the current guidelines, the effect of upward role
adjustments more often matches the effect of downward
adjustments. In the example in the preceding paragraph,
the effect of a downward role adjustment on sentencing
range is exactly equal to the effect of an upward adjust-
ment. A one-level adjustment either up or down on the
model grid changes the minimum and maximum sen-
tence in the applicable range by three years. Again, this
will not always be the case because the width of sentenc-
ing ranges does increase at three points in each Criminal
History Category (from a width of six months to a width of
one year, from a width of one year to a width of three
years, and from a width of three years to a width of five
years)." Still, the model sentencing table makes downward
and upward role adjustments far more symmetrical than
is presently the case.
Second, and again because of the increased width of
the model grid's sentencing ranges, a judge in the pro-
posed system would have increased discretion to consider
the mitigating or aggravating effects of defendant role
when setting a sentence within range. A judge who con-
cludes that a defendant played an aggravating role in the
crime, albeit not enough to have convinced a jury to award
a mandatory one-level upward adjustment, could increase
the defendant's sentence to the top of the range, which
could mean an increase of three to five years in the middle
or upper ranges of the sentencing table. Conversely, a
judge convinced of the defendant's minor participation
could sentence at the bottom of the range, once again a
decision involving three to five years of prison time for
defendants at offense level 4 or higher on the model sen-
tencing table.
Consideration of Role in Setting Sentences
within Range
Implicit in the foregoing discussion is a point that bears
emphasis. As structured, Model Sentencing Guidelines
3.i provides larger upward and downward sentence
adjustments for defendants at the most and least severe
poles of the role distribution than is the case under the
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existing Guidelines. However, this model system is
designed to account for role primarily within the parame-
ters of the enlarged sentencing ranges. Thus, a defendant
who might currently be enhanced two levels for a mana-
gerial role in a criminal undertaking involving fewer than
five participants would, under the model system, receive
no adjustment in sentencing level. Rather, the prosecu-
tion could, pursuant to Section 3.i(b)(i), argue that the
defendant's aggravating role should move the court to
sentence at the upper end of the applicable range. The
same would be true of defendants seeking leniency based
on a role that might, under current law, be categorized as
"minor" rather than "minimal."
Jury vs. Judge Fact-Finding for Role in the Offense
Incorporating considerations of role into a model system
that relies on jury fact-finding more heavily than the cur-
rent Guidelines presents several challenges. First, any
determination of a defendant's role in a criminal activity
involving multiple participants inevitably involves difficult
proof problems. Criminal conspiracies rarely have mis-
sion statements or organization charts. Likewise,
defendants and witnesses who may have played a major
role before being caught may be eager to minimize their
roles or maximize those of others once authorities step in.
Thus, proving the scope, objectives, and membership of a
criminal group, and the precise roles of each of its mem-
bers, and defending against such proof, is often
challenging.
Second, even if there is ample evidence about a
group's activities, assessing relative culpability within the
criminal group is necessarily subjective, involving
unquantifiable decisions about who is more or less
responsible for collective decisions and actions and the
harms caused thereby. To take a recurring example, is
one who personally smuggles drugs across an interna-
tional boarder more or less criminally responsible than
the person who gave him the drugs to smuggle or the
person who received the drugs from him once smuggled?
Some might respond reflexively that a "courier" is, of
course, less culpable than those who supplied or received
the drugs. Others might argue, with equal vigor, that the
international drug trade cannot function without couri-
ers, who, far from being minor players, are indispensable
members of the trafficking conspiracy and can thus never
be considered minor. Still others might contend that
whether a courier should be treated as a less culpable
minor or minimal participant depends on factors such as
whether the courier is a repeat player, how much money
he receives for his services, what knowledge he has of the
larger group, and whether he sometimes performs other
functions for the group.
The proof problems associated with assessing role
argue for involving juries only at the ends of the role spec-
trum-that is, asking them to identify only the very most
and very least culpable members of a criminal group-and
leaving to judges determinations of more subtle grada-
tions in between. Model Guideline 3.i divides the fact-
finding labor in just this way.
As to the decisions the Model Guidelines do ask juries
to make, the inevitable subjectivity of a role determination
argues for providing some measurable parameters, such
as number of participants, into the jury's consideration.
Nonetheless, role cannot be entirely quantified at either
the more or less serious poles. If role is to play a part in
setting sentencing ranges, juries must be allowed to make
some comparative decisions. These decisions, like many
others consigned to juries, will not be entirely consistent
from case to case, but we should have faith in jurors' abil-
ity to make commonsense judgments about the relative
culpability of participants in the case before them.
Model Sentencing Guidelines §3.2 Abuse of Trust
If the defendant abused a position of public or private
trust in the course of committing or concealing the
offense, increase by one level. This adjustment may not be
employed if an abuse of trust is included in the base
offense level or an applicable specific offense characteris-
tic. The adjustment may be employed in addition to an
adjustment under Model Sentencing Guidelines 3.I
(Aggravating or Mitigating Role).
Drafter's Commentary
The "abuse of special skill" provision of former U.S.S.G.
S3BI. 3 is removed as being too broadly applicable and too
tenuously related to a proper measurement of culpability.
Model Sentencing Guidelines §3.3 Causing or risking
injury
(a) If the offense involved one or more of the following cir-
cumstances, increase the offense level by one level:
(i) The offense resulted in substantial bodily injury or
serious bodily injury to a person other than the
defendant;
(2) The defendant consciously subjected another per-
son to a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death
or serious bodily injury, or aided and abetted
another participant in the offense in doing so, in
the course of committing the offense or in the
course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer in
connection with the offense;
(3) The defendant possessed a dangerous weapon (includ-
ing a firearm) in connection with the offense or was
aware that another participant in the offense did so.
(b) [OPTION ONE] If the offense (i) involved more than
one of the foregoing circumstances; (ii) involved sub-
stantial bodily injury, or a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of substantial bodily injury, to more
than one victim; or (iii) resulted in serious bodily
injury to a person other than the defendant, the court,
in addition to increasing the offense level by one level
as specified in Section (a), [shall/should ordinarily]
impose a sentence above the midpoint of the applica-
ble guideline range.
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(b) [OPTION TWO] If the offense (i) involved more
than one of the foregoing circumstances;
(ii) involved substantial bodily injury, or a substan-
tial and unjustifiable risk of substantial bodily
injury, to more than one victim; or (iii) resulted in
serious bodily injury to a person other than the
defendant, the court, in addition to increasing the
offense level by one level as specified in Section (a),
[should/may] take the presence of more than one of
the specified aggravating factors, or injury or risk of
injury to more than one victim, into account in set-
ting the defendant's sentence within the applicable
sentencing range.
(c) If the offense involved bodily injury to one or more vic-
tims, such injury or injuries should be considered by
the court as an aggravating factor when setting the
defendant's sentence within the applicable range.
Application Notes:
1. Do not apply an enhancement described in this Guide-
line if the conduct resulting in the imposition of the
enhancement is an element of the offense of conviction or
if the offense guideline in Chapter Two, or another
adjustment in Chapter Three, calls for an equivalent or
greater increase in offense level on the basis of the same
conduct.
2. The term "in connection with" in (a) (3) means the danger-
ous weapon had a purpose or effect with respect to the
offense; its presence or involvement cannot be accidental,
coincidental or entirely unrelated to the crime; instead, the
weapon at least must facilitate, or have the potential of
facilitating, the offense. See Smith v. United States, 508
U.S. 223, 238 (1993)."
3. If the court finds more than one of the factors in Model
Sentencing Guidelines ff3.3 (b), such a finding would war-
rant (but not require) imposition of the maximum
sentence provided by the applicable guideline.
4. The term "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which
involves-(A) a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme
physical pain; (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or
(D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bod-
ily member, organ, or mental faculty. See 18 U.S.C.
ff 136 5 (h)( 3 ) (cited in 18 U.S.C. ff 113 (b) (2)).
5. The term "substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury
which involves-(A) a temporary but substantial disfigure-
ment; or (B) a temporary but substantial loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member, organ,
or mental faculty. See 18 U.S.C. ff 113 (b) (1); U.S.S.G.
f 2A2. 3 .
6. The term "bodily injury" means any significant injury; e.g.,
an injury that is painful and obvious, or is of a type for
which medical attention ordinarily would be sought. See
U.S.S.G.ff iBi.1, comment. n.l(B).
7. The term "dangerous weapon" means a weapon, device,
instrument, material, or substance, animate or inanimate,




This Model Guideline serves as a generally applicable pro-
vision addressing any case where the offense caused or
risked physical injury to other persons, but as to which the
statute or guideline governing the offense does not, or
need not, account for such injury or risk of injury. This
general provision will cover anomalous individual cases in
which an ordinarily nonviolent crime results in injury or
generates risk and no provision is made in either statute
or guideline for such an unusual event. It will also permit
elimination of rarely used special provisions such as those
in the existing fraud and theft guideline, U.S.S.G. 2B1.i,
aimed at the few cases where a property crime involves
physical injury or the risk thereof12 Retention of these
provisions in a guideline devoted to customarily nonvio-
lent property crimes seemed distracting and unnecessary.
A general provision applicable to all crime types is more
efficient.
In addition, it seemed advantageous to consolidate in a
single guideline a number of provisions related to inflic-
tion of injury or creation of risk. For example, the current
Guidelines contain a separate provision for reckless
endangerment during flight, U.S.S.G. 5 3 CI.2, which
involves risk creation and should rationally be consoli-
dated with other rules involving the same consideration.
Notes on Definitions
Because the wider sentencing ranges of the Model Sen-
tencing Guidelines generate a substantial sentence
increase for each step up the offense level scale, this
guideline provides no increase in offense level for the
infliction of "bodily injury." The term "bodily injury," as
that term is used in the current guidelines, U.S.S.G. iBi.1
app. note i(B), has sometimes been construed to embrace
very minor injuries of a type that would barely require first
aid, much less serious medical attention or hospitaliza-
tion. See, e.g., United State v. Pandiello, 184 F. 3d 682 (7 th
Cir. 1999) (applying bodily injury enhancement to rob-
bery guideline in case where robbery victim sustained red
welt on the forehead that was "painful and obvious," but
did not require medical attention). Nonetheless, pursuant
to Model Sentencing Guidelines 3.3(c), infliction of bodily
injury would remain a consideration in setting the defen-
dant's sentence within the guideline sentencing range.
The definition of "dangerous weapon" in Model Sen-
tencing Guidelines 53.3 app. note 6 differs from the
current definition in U.S.S.G. iBi.i, app. note I(D), in
that it does not include simulated weapons such as toy
guns or a hand wrapped in a towel. Use of such simulated
weapons would still suffice to satisfy the "taking by intimi-
dation" element of robbery and similar offenses. See
United States v. Ray, 21 F. 3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting
distinction between simple bank robbery which can be
committed with a simulated weapon, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a),
and aggravated bank robbery pursuant to I8 U.S.C.
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\ 21I 3(d), which requires an actual dangerous weapon.
However, as noted in Ray, there is a difference in danger-
ousness between a robber carrying a toy pistol and a
robber wielding a real one, and for the purposes of this
Model Guideline, we have elected to treat the two situa-
tions differently for sentencing purposes.
Alternative Provisions
Model Sentencing Guidelines 3.3(b) is presented in alter-
native forms. In Option One, a judicial finding of the
specified injury or risk creates a requirement ("shall") or a
presumption ("should ordinarily") that the court will
impose a sentence above the midpoint of the applicable
range. In Option Two, a judicial finding of the specified
risk or injury is merely a factor that the judge should or
may take into account in setting the defendant's sentence
within the applicable range. The pros and cons of these
competing approaches are discussed at length in the Edi-
tor's Observations at the beginning of this Issue.13
Model Sentencing Guidelines §3.4 Aggravating Factors
to Consider in Setting Sentence within Range
If the offense involved one or more of the following cir-
cumstances, the court [shall/may] consider them in
setting the defendant's sentence within the applicable
guideline range:
(a) Using a minor to commit a crime: If the defendant was
at least twenty-one years of age at the time of the
offense, and used or attempted to use a person less
than eighteen years of age to commit the offense or
assist in avoiding detection of, or apprehension for, the
offense.
(b) Use of body armor in drug trafficking crimes and
crimes of violence: The offense of conviction was a
drug trafficking crime or a crime of violence, and the
defendant used body armor during the commission of
the offense, or in an attempt to avoid apprehension for
the offense.
Drafter's Commentary
Both of these factors are enhancements under the existing
Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 3BI.4 (Use of Minor) and 3BI. 5
(Body Armor). Both now call for two-offense-level upward
adjustments. Because of the increased width of the sen-
tencing ranges in the Model Grid, an upward adjustment
of one full offense level would roughly double the effect of
these provisions. There being no obvious argument for
enhancing the effect of these factors, they are accounted for
here as factors to be considered within the guideline range.
The wording of the use of a minor provision has been
altered slightly here from that employed in the current
Guidelines. In the current Guidelines, a defendant is eligi-
ble for this enhancement regardless of his or her own age.
Thus, one minor can be enhanced for working with another
minor in a criminal enterprise. It seems more reasonable to
impose an enhanced sentence on adults who corrupt those
younger than themselves. Further, the statute in response
to which the existing guideline was promulgated directed
the Commission to "promulgate guidelines or amend
existing guidelines to provide that a defendant 21 years of
age or older who has been convicted of an offense shall
receive an appropriate sentence enhancement if the defen-
dant involved a minor in the commission of the offense."
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-22, 140008, lo8 Stat. 2033 ('994).
Accordingly, Model Guideline 3.4 (b) requires that the defen-
dant be at least twenty-one years of age and thus
presumably be possessed of sufficient judgment and matu-
rity to warrant imposition of additional punishment for the
choice to corrupt a minor.
Model Sentencing Guidelines §3.5 Obstruction of Justice
If (i) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution,
or sentencing of the offense of conviction, and (ii) the
obstructive conduct related to the defendant's offense of
conviction or a closely related offense,
[OPTION ONE] the court [shall/should ordinarily] impose
a sentence above the midpoint of the
applicable guideline range.
[OPTION TWO] the court [should/may] take that fact into
account in setting the defendant's sentence
within the applicable sentencing range
Drafter's Commentary
The enhancement for obstruction of justice under the
existing Guidelines has been the focus of considerable
attention among those trying to figure out how the Blakely
and Booker decisions might be accommodated within a
simplified federal sentencing scheme. The obstruction
enhancement provokes philosophical disagreement and,
particularly during the period between Blakely and Booker,
seemed to pose a knotty practical problem.
The philosophical debate is between those who think it
entirely appropriate to enhance a defendant's sentence if
he engages in obstructive conduct during the course of his
prosecution and those who find it somehow unseemly to
increase punishment for behavior that can be seen as
nothing more than an understandable effort to escape
criminal conviction. The divergence in views is particu-
larly acute when the claimed obstruction consists
primarily of the defendant's own allegedly false or mis-
leading testimony at trial. Though few commentators are
willing to say so plainly, there is a strong sentiment
(which can be discerned even among some judges) that
imposing extra punishment for exercising the entirely
human urge to talk one's way out of trouble comes close to
infringing one's right to testify in one's own defense, or at
the least is just piling on. Others point out that, depending
on what the defendant testified about, a guilty verdict does
not necessarily mean that the defendant perjured himself
or even that the jury disbelieved the defendant. At a mini-
mum, say critics of the obstruction enhancement, if the
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government wants increased punishment for obstructive
conduct in the course of a criminal proceeding, it should
be obliged to allege and prove the crime of obstruction of
justice in a separate proceeding.
Prosecutors (and some judges) take the less indulgent
view that the right to testify does not include the right to
commit perjury, and that there is a critical difference
between putting the government to its proof and affirma-
tively seeking to mislead the jury. Moreover, they see little
utility in a requirement of bringing separate obstruction
charges. They recognize that such charges are rarely
brought due to the time and costs associated with doing so,
thus making the choice to lie on the stand virtually cost-free.
Moreover, as to in-trial obstruction, the trial judge is in a
uniquely good position to assess the claim of obstruction.
In a post-Blakedy/Booker world, the practical problem
posed by any effort to enhance a defendant's sentence for
obstructive conduct during the course of the present case is
that such conduct may well occur post-indictment or dur-
ing the trial itself, thus making it difficult or impossible to
identify the offending behavior, allege it to the jury, prove
its obstructive character, and obtain a jury finding on
whether it actually occurred. Thus, if one wants to account
for obstruction in a new system in which increases in sen-
tencing range must be the result of jury findings or
defendant admissions, obstruction presents a difficulty.
In the sentencing structure advanced here, one cannot
easily enhance a defendant's offense level for obstruction
committed during trial, and one could not do so at all with-
out unwieldy provisions for mid-trial notice to the defendant
of the intent to seek an obstruction enhancement as part of
the jury's verdict, opportunities for the defendant to rebut
the claim of obstruction, special jury instructions and per-
haps a bifurcated sentencing proceeding devoted to the
issue, and so on. The speculative advantages of providing an
offense level enhancement for obstruction are dearly out-
weighed by the procedural difficulties of doing so. That said,
the Model Guidelines described here can address obstruc-
tion in at least two ways, both involving findings of fact by
the trial judge. Model Sentencing Guidelines 53.5 suggests
two approaches: A finding of obstruction might either trig-
ger a mandatory or presumptive sentence above the
midpoint of the applicable range or simply constitute a fac-
tor the judge is advised to consider when setting a sentence
within the applicable sentencing range. Again, the pros and
cons of these competing approaches are discussed at length
in the Editor's Observations at the beginning of this Issue.' 4
Model Sentencing Guidelines 3.6 Victim-Related
Adjustments
[It is contemplated that the Model Guidelines would con-
tain provisions for victim-related adjustments analogous
to current U.S.S.G. M 3AI. to 3AI.4 . However, the
drafters of the current pilot project have not prepared text
for these provisions.]
Notes
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